

@mastersthesis {7062,
	title = {Four essays on intergovernmental fiscal relations, intergovernmental monetary relations, and policy changes in {China}},
	year = {1994},
	note = {9526154},
	school = {Georgetown University},
	type = {phdPh.{D}.},
	address = {Ann Arbor},
	abstract = {This dissertation consists of four essays. The first essay, "Modelling Central-Local Revenue-Sharing Relations," discusses the impact of the lack of credibility of the Chinese central government on localities{\textquoteright} revenue collections. The model shows that under the Chinese system, the center{\textquoteright}s pre-announced revenue-sharing methods are time-inconsistent. Without a mechanism that can force the central government to commit to the pre-announced policy, the localities are tempted to reduce their tax collection efforts. The finding of the model suggests that applying a rule that restricts the center{\textquoteright}s frequent revision of revenue-sharing methods may help solve the time-inconsistency problem. This second essay, "Regions{\textquoteright} Lobbying, Time Inconsistency, and Expenditure Determination," analyzes the process of expenditure target formation in the framework of a central-local game. It is shown that under a system of soft-budget constraint{\textendash}a system that does not prohibit regions{\textquoteright} lobbying for transfers from the center after the budget is officially approved by the Congress{\textendash}the regions make too much lobbying efforts and result in excessive expenditure expansion, compared to the system of hard-budget constraint in which such ex post lobbying is prohibited. This third essay, "Central Government Credibility and Economic Overheating," develops a game theoretic model which shows how China{\textquoteright}s economic overheating over the past decade can be a consequence of its decentralized financial system. It is shown that in order to induce a higher credit ceiling from the central bank, the local banks purposely under-invest in the center{\textquoteright}s priority project. Without a mechanism that can guarantee the central bank{\textquoteright}s commitment to the pre-announced credit ceiling, the central bank will have the ex post incentive to revise the ceiling upward, thus creating inflation. In the fourth essay, "A Dynamic Model of Policy Change: The Case of Chinese Agricultural Policy," a dynamic model is developed to explain the abrupt changes in China{\textquoteright}s water conservancy policy over the past decade. The model shows that the government{\textquoteright}s rational learning about the frequency of destructive flood can lead to an investment policy that is "mistaken" from ex post point of view.},
	keywords = {0501:Economics, 0503:Agricultural economics, 0508:Finance, Agricultural economics, economics, Finance, Social sciences},
	url = {http://search.proquest.com/docview/304107874?accountid=14270},
	author = {Ma, Jun}
}
