

@mastersthesis {7014,
	title = {Essays on the economics of common property and public goods},
	year = {2006},
	note = {3237971},
	school = {University of Michigan},
	type = {phdPh.{D}.},
	address = {Ann Arbor},
	abstract = {Common property resources and public goods are two of the most common forms of market failures studied in economics, and are closely related. Using both theoretical and empirical methods I explore the issues of interstate river allocations and preservation of open-space/historic resources as well as examine a possible general solution to the tragedy of the commons. Chapter 1 aims to estimate the effects of voter referenda for preservation on property values using micro-data on real estate transactions in suburban Boston, Massachusetts between the years of 1996 and 2004. The subject of my analysis is the Massachusetts Community Preservation Act (CPA). Treating passage of the CPA as a natural experiment, I compare towns which pass the CPA to similar towns which do not. Using the time-series data on property transactions I measure the short-run property value effects of the CPA at the local level using fixed-effects analysis. Simultaneously, I am able to calculate a range of possible long-term benefits from the CPA through the use of hedonic analysis. In Chapter 2, I explore a {\textquoteright}partnership solution{\textquoteright} to the tragedy of the commons. Each of n players maximizes his payoff by joining a partnership in the first stage and by choosing his effort at the second stage. Each agent must pay his own cost of effort but receives an equal share of his partnership{\textquoteright}s revenue. The incentive to free ride created by such partnerships naturally offsets the incentive to exert excessive effort inherent in common property problems. This institutional arrangement can, under specified circumstances, induce socially optimal effort in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Likewise, firms in an oligopolistic industry, organized in such partnerships, are able to induce monopoly profits. Finally, Chapter 3 uses the tools of economic bargaining theory to study negotiated interstate river-water allocations. I develop a model of bargaining to answer three questions: (1) what properties characterize bargained water allocations; (2) how do compact allocations differ from the efficient allocations; and (3) how do government policies affect these outcomes? I show that compact allocations are unlikely to be economically efficient. Instead, the act of negotiation leads to a balance between efficiency and equity: compacts will tend to over-allocate water to relatively low value users at the expense of higher value users, as well as favor less risk averse states. Well-considered subsidies on water use by low-value users will tend to improve the overall utilitarian efficiency of the bargaining equilibrium, as will encouraging multi-dimensional bargaining. Whether or not such a re-allocation is desirable, however, depends upon the preferences of policymakers.},
	keywords = {0501:Economics, 0768:Environmental science, Bargaining, Common property, economics, Environmental economics, Environmental science, Essays, Health and environmental sciences, Land use, Models, Policy Making, Preservation, Property values, Public good, Public goods, Social sciences, Studies, Theory, Tragedy of the commons, Water resources},
	url = {http://search.proquest.com/docview/305310378?accountid=14270},
	author = {Heintzelman, Martin D.}
}
