

@mastersthesis {6219,
	title = {The logistics of the {Roman} army in the {Jewish} {War}},
	year = {1991},
	note = {9209887},
	school = {Columbia University},
	type = {phdPh.{D}.},
	address = {Ann Arbor},
	abstract = {In the Jewish War (66-74 A.D.), the Romans foraged for fodder, firewood and water, but used supply lines to provide grain and other foodstuffs. A series of bases, connected by supply lines, were used to provision armies in the field. Chapter One surveys 1st century Palestine. Certain regions, e.g. Galilee, could theoretically support the army by foraging{\textendash}other areas, e.g. Idumaea, could not. Fluctuations in crop yield made it undesirable to utilize local resources. Chapter Two discusses the Roman army{\textquoteright}s organization. Two types of legion were utilized in the war, a 60-century and a 59-century legion, and they were smaller than is generally thought. Milliary auxiliary units were employed. Allied forces were generally organized along Roman lines. Chapter Three covers the military diet and the feeding of animals. Grain and other items were issued in regular rations. Grazing provided significant amounts of animals{\textquoteright} needs, thus not all fodder need be brought with the army. Chapter Four analyzes the collection system of the Roman army. Provisions were collected through taxes, compulsory purchase and requisition. There was an important distinction between collecting grain (frumentatio) done infrequently, and the daily collection of fodder (pabulatio), firewood (lignatio), and water (aquatio). Foraging is not always militarily desirable, even if theoretically possible. Chapter Five examines the distribution of provisions. Supplies were collected in operational bases, then moved to the army over supply lines, utilizing depots. Tactical bases supported the army in the field. Campaign logistics were administered on an ad hoc basis, but a permanent military accounting office probably existed. Chapter Six discusses transportation. Movement of supplies by sea was desirable, but the Roman{\textquoteright}s ability to move supplies by land has been underestimated. The factors limiting supply lines were more administrative and economic than technological. Chapter Seven explores the Jewish War. The affects of logistics on strategy are discussed, e.g. Cestius Gallus{\textquoteright} retreat in 66 and the anomalous "winter quartering" of Vespasian in July 68. Many Roman military decisions were determined by the need to secure supply lines to support the siege of Jerusalem.},
	keywords = {0579:Ancient civilizations, Ancient civilizations, army, military history, Social sciences},
	url = {http://search.proquest.com/docview/303940230?accountid=14270},
	author = {Roth, Jonathan}
}
